Chapter 14
Man and Multicellular Organism
More than 1,200,000 different species of living things
(including plants) have now been identified, 500,000 of them insects. Each
of these multitudinous forms represents a system for the division of labor,
a quite specific arrangement of functional units. Each is capable of doing
certain things, the basic object being the same in every case: first, to
acquire energy and matter and rebuild them into its specific structure;
and second, to keep disruptive or hostile forces at bay.
In order to impose a certain order on this vast multitude
and render it easier for our brain to comprehend, scientists have divided
living creatures into groups. Linnaeus, the first to tackle this monumental
task successfully, proceeded from external and structural similarities.
Then, when the theory of evolution according to which all surviving species
are branches of the same great family tree-achieved its breakthrough with
Darwin, biologists strove to make this natural relationship the basis of
classification; in other words, to group together species which are closely
related in terms of evolutionary history. This modified many aspects of
the system devised by Linnaeus and brought a "natural system" into being.
The first major step toward classification was to separate
the two great animal and vegetable kingdoms. These two groups differ fundamentally
in their modes of acquiring energy and matter.
(original book page 153)
The two kingdoms do, it is true, overlap at the base,
so no clear dividing line can be drawn at that level. Many unicellular
organisms may be regarded as either animals or plants and are therefore
included in their respective systems by zoologists and botanists alike.
There are, for instance, minute flagellate organisms which both acquire
and assimilate food in animal fashion. The life process split up and evolved
an immense number of organizational types in each of these two main fields.
Both animals and plants may be further divided into unicellular
and multicellular organisms, but here too the frontier is ill-defined.
Types of amoebae exist which remain unicellular for a time and then combine
to form extremely complicated multicellular structures (e.g., the mucor).
Some flagellate organisms form colonies by normal division, these consisting
of sixteen cells which remain firmly united. In the case of others, hundreds
of cells form a globule by means of a process which already amounts to
a division of labor among individual cells. However, since multicellular
organisms are derived from unicellular, it is only natural that such transitional
forms should occur. Some of these have continued to reproduce themselves
to this day, thus affording us an opportunity, even now, of studying the
erstwhile course of evolution.
The zoologist (as opposed to the botanist, who makes
no such distinction) divides the kingdom of animal organisms into the two
subkingdoms: Protozoa (unicellular) and Metazoa (multicellular). Multicellular
organisms are divided according to their main structural characteristics
into a further filing system of categories (phyla, classes, orders, families,
etc.). For example, the following major phyla are distinguished: Porifera,
Coelenterata, Arthropoda, Mollusca, Echinodermata, and Chordata. The lastnamed
phylum is subdivided into several subphyla, of which the mammals are one.
One of their constituent orders is that of the primates, and the latter,
in turn, includes the species Homo sapiens, or man.
Where physical organization is concerned, only minor
characteristics distinguish us from the apes. But view man in the light
suggested by this book, namely, as a creature which has amplified its physical
organization by the addition of artificial
(original book page 154)
organs, and the picture changes. The old form of systematic
classification loses its validity.
In man, the life process has attained a superior principle
of organization which differs as fundamentally from that of the Metazoa
as their principle of organization differs from that of the Protozoa. In
man, the life process achieved yet another immensely significant advance.
The creature "man" succeeded in supplementing the integral organs built
up by his hereditary formula with other organs which need not consist of
human tissue and which he can discard, exchange, and even operate by means
of energy extraneous to his own body. The same individual can thus transform
himself into a variety of organized productive systems. The hunter with
his rifle and telescopic sight is quite a different organizational structure
from the fisherman who operates with boat and nets. Further development
of specialized occupations – which we shall discuss a bit laterproduced
specialists such as cobblers, lawyers, and dentists, all of whom represent
distinct organizational structures.
The naked human frame is only the starting point for
the formation of productive systems comprising many more functional units,
just as the germ cell of the metazoon is only a starting point for the
formation of larger productive systems. Consequently, anyone who adduces
this centerpiece alone – the naked human frame – for purposes of comparison
and classification is not doing justice to the special nature of the further
development that has taken place. It is only the entire productive body
of the employed person which is comparable to the bodies of organisms.
Functionally, the transition from multicellular creature
to human specialist can be very clearly formulated, being dependent upon
a decisive functional change. From the bottom of the scale up to the highest
multicellular organisms, the hereditary formula has always functioned to
develop individual organs. In man, the central nervous system-hitherto
responsible only for organic control – took on the additional task of forming
more organs whose purposive employment it likewise controlled. So important
were the consequences of this functional take-over and the structural changes
arising there from that it is justifiable to regard human types of organization
as
(original book page 155)
radically different from the rest. Given the existence
of artificial organs, it is only logical to classify the productive bodies
man developed as a third subkingdom on a par with unicellular and multicellular
organisms, distinction being drawn between the numerous categories of human
occupations. In view of the continuous flowering of the life process, this
form of classification seems far more appropriate than one which ignores
man's peculiar abilities and simply groups him with the apes – putative
ancestors whom he has, where organization is concerned, outstripped by
a vast distance.
What of the individual forms of livelihood which have
led to man's accretion of power? To be more exact, what of the structure
and behavior of these "productive bodies" and their real bases of existence?
This is precisely the question the biologist asks with
respect to all other organisms. The central problem is always: How does
this beetle or that alga acquire the quantities of energy and matter necessary
to its development – that is to say, in the broadest sense, its food? And
again: How does our understanding of this central problem help explain
the physical organization in question and the behavior peculiar to its
species? Applying this form of inquiry to the specialized productive bodies
which man constructs in his various forms of occupation, we find the first
stage to be very similar to those of animal organisms. The hunter and fisherman
are good examples of this. Both forms of specialist are equipped with artificial
organs and, equally, with the acquired coordinations needed to employ these
organs usefully. The product of their endeavors is as certainly food as
it is in the case of any animal, except that these human beings succeed
in considerably increasing their yield and reducing their exertions by
the specialized amplification of their bodies.
The second stage comprises forms of livelihood in which
human intelligence finds still clearer expression, e.g., agriculture. In
the natural state, each area can normally support only a limited number
of individuals of a certain organizational type – in other words, of a
particular species of animal or plant. Our ancestors, apes and primeval
men, were just as affected by this limitation as any other living creature.
Apes lived on fruit,
(original book page 156)
parts of plants, and smaller animals; primitive man extended
his hunting activities to larger beasts. Although the idea of refraining
from eliminating all edible plants in a given area and of artificially
cultivating plants suitable for food seems quite logical to us today, it
actually represented a truly gigantic step forward, because the same area
could support many more individuals in this way. Precisely the same factors
applied to cattle breeding. Far more quarry could be raised on the same
ground, and the difficulties of hunting diminished.
This was not, however, the greatest advance of all. As
we saw, man succeeded in forming far larger communities than accorded with
his hereditary disposition to live in groups. These larger groups evolved
a division of labor whereby individuals could specialize in different pursuits.
Because of the importance attained by artificial organs, it happened in
the course of time that some members of the community specialized in their
manufacture. Food could now be acquired by bartering these products. This,
too, seems obvious today. In fact, it presupposes a feat of intelligence
which demands closer scrutiny.
Agriculture itself demanded an ability to relate causes
and effects separated by more than half a year. This feat of intelligence
consisted in grasping that activities which brought no immediate return-clearing
ground, digging, etc.-could very well produce food at a later point in
time. It was exactly the same with cattle breeding. Here, man had to grasp
that not killing an animal could lead to the acquisition of more food on
the face of it, a paradoxical notion. Such is the essential feat of intelligence
of which the ape's brain is incapable. It can relate causes and effects,
but only when these are in close temporal and spatial conjunction. When
we come to the acquisition of food by the manufacture of artificial organs,
the occupational relationship becomes considerably more complicated still.
In the case of a sword smith, for instance, none of his occupational movements
led to the acquisition of animals or plants, yet his activities brought
him food. The connection between cause and effect has here been rendered
still more obscure by an intermediate factor. Experiments conducted with
I chimpanzees by Yerkes and Wolfe have shown that apes, too,
(original book page 157)
can be made to grasp such an indirect connection. They
cannot, however, produce the connection by themselves.
Human barter did not become really fruitful until the
further invention of money. Only this neutral medium-itself an artificial
organ-made it possible to convert any one form of output into any other
and, if need be, acquire the yield of several forms of output by other
people in exchange for one such form of output by oneself.
A need for other people thus became the essential basis
of such human occupations. Individual human productive bodies are just
as much adapted in structure and behavior to this need – which we
generally refer to as the market – as animals are to their sources of food.
And just as the emergence of each new animal species became, in turn, a
basis for the existence of other species (as a potential source of food),
so every new form of occupation in the human economy became a basis for
the existence of others. Again, just as each area can support only so many
members of an animal or vegetable species, so each rural district or urban
quarter can support only a limited number of doctors, shoemakers, or grocers.
Thus, although outwardly very different from animal and vegetable organisms,
human productive bodies are subject to similar laws. The first point of
difference is that their parts are not firmly integrated and that they
can therefore grow far more freely than organisms. Their artificial organs
can be renewed as required. "Reproduction" follows quite a different and
far simpler course, and it is even possible for one productive body to
transform itself into another. On the other hand, the competition between
productive bodies which strive to exploit the same source of livelihood
is just as fierce. And, once again, a process of natural selection ensures
that the most efficient bodies prevail.
What complicates the picture is that man uses artificial
organs not merely for productive purposes but also for the attainment of
pleasure. This human tendency, of which we shall have more to say later,
is a further manifestation of our intelligence and progress. Animals and
plants cannot employ the product of their exertions for anything but structural
growth or multiplication, but man is not so constrained. He can use his
surplus production to procure pleasure, and for that pur-
(original book page 158)
pose he has created countless other artificial organs
which clothe him like a gorgeous and resplendent robe. However, what exclusively
determines the existence and advancement of the individual is his acquired
structure, which must therefore be enlisted in any account and definition
of these special organizational forms of the life process. This structure
invariably consists, first, of the employed person himself, and second,
of the totality of the artificial organs requisite to his form of productive
activity, whether these be owned by the person or merely hired by him or
communally available within the framework of an existing community. Third,
the structure must also embody all the control formulas necessary to a
particular form of occupation. These are present in the brain of the person
but may exist partly in the shape of artificial organs (plans, manuals,
etc.).
Through the medium of man, the life process attained
a still greater expansion of power and the formation of still more complex
structures. Various people with manifold artificial organs banded themselves
together, as we have shown, into even more highly integrated bodies – hence
the existence of firms, factories, and other productive organizations.
In these, man himself assumes the role of a mere organ, and many of his
functions may be just as well performed by an artificially created structure
(machine, apparatus). If we apply the same criterion to these types of
organizations, too, they represent yet another organic subkingdom – the
fourth.
These productive organizations, to employ my proposed
term for this new category, may be constructed wholly or partly of other
organizations (as in the case of a financial trust or political system).
This does not, however, create a need for more basic distinctions. However
intricate the process becomes, no new principle of organization will emerge.
An organization which forms part of another is just as much an organ of
the same as a man or machine. It is no more than a functional unit, a performer
of very specific tasks within the work-sharing system. Hence, this group
contains all independently operating superindividual productive bodies
including political systems – insofar as these represent organizations
which promote increased production. By contrast, a system of government
which
(original book page 159)
confines its functions to external defense and the maintenance
of internal order is a communal organ belonging to its citizens. There
is no clear line of demarcation between the third subkingdom of occupations
and the fourth subkingdom of productive organizations. If an employed person-a
shoemaker, say – employs assistants, these constitute artificial organs
within the morphological structure of his occupational body. Once his business
expands into an industrial footwear-manufacturing concern, it becomes a
superindividual productive body – a superindividual organization. It is
immaterial how the proceeds are divided up, whether one man bears the risks
and reaps the profits, or whether a group of people hold shares in the
organization. What matters is the superindividuality which transforms even
a proprietor into an organizational – and replaceable – component. This
superindividuality constitutes a special factor which justifies the isolation
of a fourth subkingdom. Like all classifications of the natural system,
this is an artificial classification which we impose on nature for the
sake of easier supervision and better understanding, so we should not be
worried by the absence of clear definition. In practice, an employed person
whose artificial organs include human assistants will continue to be classified
in the third subkingdom for as long as he himself is the genuinely dominant
productive component. If more and more specialists join a productive body
until each of them, including the central organizer, produces only a limited
share of the total output, this turns the organization into a different
and more highly integrated productive system.
The transition from multicellular organism to human specialist
is considerably clearer. Not only does it follow from the assumption of
organic development by the central nervous system, which we have already
discussed, but it is characterized by another and no less important functional
change. Each evolutionary advance – each specific mutation – made by every
multicellular organism had always been governed by the hereditary formula.
Only changes in that formula could lead to hereditary modifications and
improvements. One institution which promoted such improvements was the
coupling of the sexes. By this means, hereditary formulas were mingled
and random hereditary changes (arising from mutations) were per-
(original book page 160)
muted ad infinitum. This increased the likelihood that
a more efficient structure would take shape. The organizational type "man"
now underwent an important change in that his central nervous system assumed
the function of a promoter of evolution. Thanks to our intelligence, we
human beings improved ourselves. Having succeeded in improving our bodies,
we passed on the formulas for newly developed structures to others – and
what is more, directly (via speech and writing). From then on, the whole
laborious system of mingling hereditary factors by means of the sexual
act became obsolete. The tempo of potential improvement – in the sense
of adaptation and accretion of power – was accelerated a hundred thousandfold.
Where multicellular organisms were concerned, the way had been paved for
this development among the learners when their central nervous system increasingly
assumed the task of creating behavioral formulas. In man, a stage was suddenly
reached where the central nervous system intervened in the matter of physical
development and improvement. It planned the construction and linkage of
supplementary functional units, supervised their testing and manufacture,
and assumed responsibility for passing on formulas for their construction
and use. It now became possible to pass on physical structures created
by experience as well. Even the need for active procreation-hitherto an
inseparable feature of the life process – was now superseded. Productive
bodies formed by men may also be copied by other men, so that a productive
body can reproduce itself without the slightest expenditure of effort.
The dividing line between the numerous organizational types represented
among multicellular organisms and the far more successful productive bodies
constituted by human specialists and productive organizations is thus very
distinct; it is characterized by several basic functional changes: Only
our body itself remained within the competence of the hereditary formula.
That which constitutes our real physical peculiarity, on the other hand,
became the responsibility of the central nervous system.
The term "species" was originally governed by the criterion
of sexual compatibility. Individual creatures were ascribed to the same
species if they could mate and produce fertile offspring. Difficulties
later arose in the case of many classifications,
(original book page 161)
and it was decided to group as a species those related
creatures which conform in basic structural characteristics. The system
of classifying productive bodies evolved by the life process advanced in
the foregoing chapter takes this mode of observation a stage further. Because
the life process has superseded both sexuality and the need for active
procreation, it is no longer justifiable to define the structural types
attained by the life process essentially in terms of these characteristics.
To do so may still serve a purpose up to the level of the apes, but there
is a radical change in premises from the human specialist onward. At this
level, the species can be defined only as a spatiotemporal order which
possesses viability and, thus, expediency with respect to a certain environmental
situation. The term "species," like many other human concepts, is a man-made
category artificially erected in the midst of nature. Demarcation thus
has practical value alone and is not by any means a natural phenomenon.