Humans are the germ cell of the most powerful energons that have developed on our planet. At the same time, their wishes, needs and desires form the basis of existence for all these energons created by them. They build factories: Their market – i.e. their source of acquisition – represents the human need for this or that product. They establishe world-wide trade organisations. Their source of acquisition – i.e. their market – is the existing need for goods. They develop governmental systems of incredible power. These structures can only survive if there is a corresponding need for such organisations – whether in the form of an auxiliary tool for society, or as means for individuals reaching for power.

Two tendencies which depend, indeed even condition each other, form the basis of this whole development. The first tendency is the human impulse to build up such acquisition structures – in order to live and to create convenience. Secondly, this energon structure and this search for convenience requires efforts by others, i.e. represents a source of acquisition for other energons. In this case, we can draw a remote parallel to the interdependence of animals and plants. As these two preconditioned each other in the first part of evolution, there exited an equally decisive dependence between those who offered and those who demanded. Without corresponding needs, the spreading of acquired sources of acquisition through barter would have been impossible, and without those sources of acquisition, human needs could not have been satisfied.

Hence, the key to the understanding of the second part of evolution are human beings, or, more precisely: our controlling instincts. It must be said that human sources of acquisition show the same scheme as those instincts. If we want to know details about human desires, we just need to look at what is being offered to a human. It is true that – on some occasions – there is an offer which is neither wanted nor necessary; however, such energons will inevitably founder or they improve their adaptation towards the actual need. One can say that offer reflects demand – more or less. All human sources of acquisition that acquire through barter are adapted to some existing human desires – like key and keyhole. If we want to understand the key, we need to examine the keyholes – the human desires: the motives of human action and decisions.

The theory of energons clearly shows how we have to proceed. We search for the reason for actions and reactions, i.e. for the explanation of behaviour. If they result from education and individual experience, they are difficult to analyse, as those influences and experiences may be of very different kinds. If, however, behaviour is based upon inherited information, comparisons with animals – especially vertebrates – are possible and their behaviour will tell us a lot about how the "motives" for our actions arise.

Consequently, there are two decisive questions to answer: To what extent do inherited structures of control influence human behaviour and, in this sense, to what extent is it determined, i.e. dependent? To what extent are we – personally – responsible for our behaviour – i.e. how independent is our behaviour?

From the viewpoint of evolution, this formulation seems logical. Still, many people sticking to outdated thought-patterns refuse to accept this kind of question.

Until recently, the study of human activities – human behaviour in the widest sense – was limited to sciences that hardly impinged on research into nature. Sciences in the field of culture, art, economics, politics and law, as well as – to a certain extent – sociology, psychology and philosophy put human beings at the centre of their approaches. Because our life is so different from that of plants and animals, this method seemed logical and natural. And religious doctrines justified this even more: humans had been called upon by supernatural forces, and even forms the centre of such a planned "creation".

All those aspects led to the result that we tried to analyse the human "ego" or "I" from the basis of the human "I" – with the help of our spirit we wanted to explain precisely this spirit. From a scientific point of view, this is our central nervous system’s attempt to analyse and explore itself. If we see it from the angle of the energon theory, it is an attempt to set an functional unit to act against oneself.

Some philosophers even went so far as to describe our "I", our thoughts and feelings as the actual and sole reality, while they consider environment as something not provable¹. And different religious doctrines – in particular Buddhism and Christianity – explain that this "I" (consciousness, thinking, "soul") would link us directly with the world’s reason and must then be seen as a phenomenon outside of nature.

From this point of departure systems of definitions and valuation developed, categories of thoughts were set up and named. Other life forms were measured by other standards, and relations in this field hardly found any place in the assessment of the human problem.

Even the theory of the origin of species could not bring about a radical change in this attitude, which – like every established point of view – persists almost unchallenged. Some people accepted that we stem from the animal kingdom, others did not, and there was no real interest in this field. Even if this theory were to be proved right, people said, it would not have implications on the assessment of human beings. A short look at humans and animals was enough to demonstrate an enormous gap between them – namely in behaviour. There was bodily correspondence, but our actual life and its motives showed great differences. Of course, similar instincts existed, but they only concerned the outer appearance of the phenomenon "humans". The centre of our problems was rather seen in spirit, soul, everything that reaches far beyond all material items. In principle, many people do not accept any other kind of approach. They believe that a different approach would push us down into the abysses of materialism and that the prevailing basis of perception preconditions all our cultural creations. Right or wrong, they feel obliged to keep the flag of "actual and real humanity" flying.

However, the – today undeniable – theory of the origin of species imperatively requires another approach. If we proceed from human beings, we choose the most complicated and complex phenomenon as our basis. And as we are human beings, too, this point of departure is everything but objective². In this sense, various philosophers have posed the question whether it is right to use the tool of our perception, namely our spirit, in order to contemplate oneself directly. With regard to plants and animals, we are far more objective.

If all organisms form a part of a single, great development, another, somewhat different possibility allows research into our conduct, but making a major diversion. This research path starts at the opposite end: at the most primitive known organisms. It begins with the simplest forms of life, with the simplest forms of conduct, and leads – step by step – up the ladder of evolution.

Comparative examination shows how functional processes in organisms are generated and explains the roots of more complex phenomena of behaviour in higher animals. Only at this point does the diversion lead to humans. In this case, it is not our uniqueness which is put in the first place, but our common, unspectacular aspects – they are seen as a further development of animal behaviour. Consequently, our brain does not contemplate itself, except through a diversion into its historical development. The course of this development can be reconstructed via today’s existing species³. Hence, the inherited elements are selected first; and thus uniqueness and new aspects of humans can be determined.

This kind of research is in its infancy.

Konrad Lorenz provided the major impetus to the comparative examination of animal behaviour. During recent decades, he and his students successfully proved that the most important phenomena of the instinctive behaviour of higher animals are connected with a few mechanisms in the central nervous system, working on quite a similar basis in different individuals. Some have already been mentioned and others will be added. On the following pages, a brief overview will be given:

• First: "Instinctive motor control" is quite a common phenomenon. When a butterfly leaves its pupa there is no need for it to learn to fly. The required and complex commands from the brain to the acting muscles have already been co-ordinated. The co-ordination blueprint which is necessary for this process is built up by the genetically inherited material; this is also the case as regards the brain, the head, the whole multi-cellular body. This is why we talk about "hereditary co-ordination."

• Second: "Innate recognition" is also a widely known phenomenon. All higher animals are able to select quite specific combinations out of a whole range of sensations: they recognise them: In this case, we speak of key stimuli, or it is a signal between two animals, of a "trigger". For example: the male stickleback recognises another male stickleback by the characteristic red belly. The animal reacts similarly if we present it a sausage, the end of which is painted red. If we turn the sausage round, so that the red point is at the top. the stickleback does not react. Here, the cerebral cells do some data-processing. As a rule, such a hereditary "recognition" of an environmental situation is linked with a certain motor movement. In the case of our stickleback, the key stimulus, "longish body, underside red" sets off aggressive conduct.

• Third: Between these two hereditary abilities – and we have not talked about them yet – we find the "instincts". Numerous researchers share the point of view of the Russian biologist Pavlov: every example of hereditary animal conduct (instinct) could be derived from reflexes. They thought: the animal responds to specific stimuli ("stimulus situation") and reacts in a particular way. But there is more to it. Between the kinetic and sensorial blueprints a third one comes into the play: instinct. In simple words, it functions as follows: If the animal does not encounter a certain combination of stimuli which it can recognise through its inherited information (e.g. prey or a sexual partner), it will act in a restless way and will start an active or passive search in order to find this combination. It tries to find "prey" or the "sexual" partner", to be more precise: the corresponding key stimuli or triggers. If the animal finds them, its instinct starts (feeding, mating). If it still does not encounter those stimuli this "excitement may be diverted towards other channels". In that case, the animal carries out its hereditary co-ordination in vain, or another form of hereditary co-ordination, not related to this instinctive behaviour, will follow. In that way, the animal can work off its own stimuli. These drives are variable and lead their own lives, as it were. If they are active, then the animal only looks for the key stimulant to which its instinctive behaviour is directed. If the drive is worked off, then it does not pay attention to such key stimulants any longer – and other drives dominate its behaviour.

• Fourth: with animals certain innate behavioural pattern are not fully developed at the time of the animals’ birth, they only mature later, as with some organs. In such cases it seems as if the animal has only acquired the respective behaviour – however, the truth is that it is innate and only matures later. This is why it was believed that doves still have to learn how to fly, as young doves cannot yet fly. However, an experiment prove the opposite. Young doves were brought up with their wings tied up so that they were never able to use them. When they had grown up the ties were removed – and alas, they were able to fly. Thus, doves do not learn that ability, but the building of the necessary steering-structure, which is caused by the genetic blueprint, is not fully developed when the bird hatches out.

• Fifth: certain innate behavioural patterns are not complete: not until a specific sensory impression at specific stages of their developments occurs is this the case. This is for instance comparable to a cooking recipe which is as such complete but which lacks certain data that have to be filled in. Accordingly, with young ducks the "following-reaction" is innate, however, whom the animal follows depends on the sensory impressions it has between the 13th and 16th hour after its hatching out. Normally the young duck sees its mother – and then follows the mother. Thus it happens that the mother’s characteristics become the key stimulants that trigger off that behaviour. If, on the contrary, the young duck – in an experiment – is shown a red balloon instead, then it will only follow red balloons. The mother is not able to trigger off the following-reaction any more. This is called "imprinting". A behaviour that is actually innate is completed by the missing part, it is imprinted. With some animals the sexual partner is determined by that. If young roosters in their "sensitive phases" are only shown ducks instead of chickens, then they will later, once they have reached sexual maturity, only mate with female ducks. Chickens will then be of no interest to them.

• Sixth: many animals are able to refine innate behavioural patterns through learning or they can even build up totally new behavioural patterns. For the young toad it is instinctive to jump at even the smallest moving object. If it is stung by an insect, then this sensory impression is "associated" with the innate pattern. In future, the toad will not jump at similarly looking, moving small bodies anymore. Consequently, this is an improvement, a refining of the key stimulant which by than becomes more "differentiated". If the dog learns to "give his paw", then this is an already fully acquired new behavioural pattern built up by learning. It is not influenced by the genetic blueprint. The dog develops the necessary co-ordination through the instructions of humans but perfectly individually ("co-ordination of acquisition"). This is already a low-level intelligent performance.

• Seventh: such learning, too, does not happen completely "involuntarily". What it should learn preferably can also be instinctive in the animal. This was only revealed after in-depth experiments. Accordingly, with chaffinches the specific singing is imprinted between the fourth and sixth month. If during that period the young bird is kept from hearing other chaffinches and if instead it hears the singing of other kinds of birds, then, a year later when its singing-skill sets in it will sing accurately like these other kinds of birds. If, on the other hand, it hears a few different kinds of singing of birds in that period and amongst them also the singing of chaffinches, then it will decide in favour of its own species. This is a meaningful connection: it is thus innate for the organism, in what "direction" it preferably develops its life.

Numerous authors have shown the evident parallels between animal and human behaviour in "amusing" or "provocative" portrayals from which the scanty field of research has hardly profited. They depict what is actually a mere supposition or daring hypothesis as proven results of research⁵.

In the meantime, very little has been proven, hardly anything. The difficulty lies in the experiment. With animals it can be determined what is innate and what is acquired: the two experiments with the tied up young doves and the chaffinches are examples of that. With human beings, however, analogous experiments – which would have to be prolonged over years and which would in most cases require the total isolation of a child – are completely out of the question. On the other hand, some parallels cannot be seen clearly without experiments.

To this another important argument may be added. Comparative investigations with animals have shown that the innate steering-mechanisms are rather "conservative". In the course of evolution they have, whenever they became superfluous, only receded relatively slowly. There even exist examples that organs have receded while the nerve-structures in charge of their steering still remained intact, even active. In such cases the animals make movements which appear meaningless – and which are only explained by proving that there once existed an organ necessary for the performing of them⁶. This, however, clearly runs counter to the fact that with the transition from the manlike ape to primitive humans extreme recessions of steering-mechanisms have taken place. This development – as we today know – did not take much more than two million years: a rather short span of time seen from the viewpoint of evolution.

Even with great caution and hesitation the following claims should be defensible:

There are only very few examples of genetic co-ordination in human beings. The sucking movement as well as coughing, sneezing, crying, and laughing are innate with a baby. Also other basic elements of human mimicry might to a large degree be innate. With higher "learning animals" (apes, dogs, the big cats, etc.) there is also only relatively little genetic co-ordination. The advantageous ability of learning required the recession of rigidly determined motor activity.

Innate recognition might influence human behaviour in many aspects. For instance, ulcerous skin triggers off a feeling of revulsion. Biologically this is rather useful as ulcerous skin is a sign of illness. To recognise that illness and to avoid contagion by keeping at a distance is of advantage. Yet, what is interesting here is that we also project this reaction onto animals that have similar skins – therefore we also find toads revolting although their skin is perfectly healthy⁷.

Lorenz found out that with our domestic animals the innate mechanisms that steer behaviour have to a large degree lost much precision. Practically this means that their innate mechanisms of recognition appeal to many more stimulants than was the case with their ancestors living in the wild. These mechanisms lost in "selectivity" – which, according to Lorenz, is a consequence of domestication. The same phenomenon also appears to have occurred in human beings. We shield ourselves from natural dangers and defend ourselves – for instance through medicine – from natural selection. The mechanism which originally should only react towards sick human skin has lost in precision. Now it also reacts to similar sensory impressions – for instance to toad skin.

This "shift" of a reaction is rather insignificant, but others are not. Accordingly, the human sense of beauty probably has its most important root in the innate recognition of a strongly and harmonically built representative of the other sex. Amongst different possible partners we preferably choose the one "we like best" which is a reaction that cannot be steered by reason. Biologically it was significant because by that the most harmonic and strongest – thus the most healthy – is preferably reproduced. Also this innate blueprint of recognition obviously lost in precision and reacts to completely different objects if they match our sense of beauty somehow. What for us is "beautiful", thus is not beautiful per se – but merely made in that way in order to trigger off our innate value-reaction⁸.

Consequently, here, too, our "free will" is put into question. It is not we who look for the beautiful – but the beautiful wins power over us.

There is every reason to believe that the same applies within the ethical field. The reaction of indignation when we observe that a child is battered is innate – it is "fixed in its views" as Lorenz puts it. Such a scene one can watch dozens of times in a row in a film, and still one always responds to it⁹.

One kind of behaviour which philosophy and religion have often considered as a human speciality is thus reduced to a rather "mechanical" process. Animals forming herds show the same innate reactions – only mostly more strongly. According to Lorenz these belong to those instincts which receded early in humans due to their "self-domestication". As a result, this way of acting is not a noble aspect of our free will – or the motion of a "consciousness" which only exists in humans – but instead the innate reaction of our central nervous system to a key stimulant. We respond with a feeling of indignation – whether we want to or not¹⁰.

With apes the social defence reaction plays an important role. If a herd meets another one, the animals develop aggression and combat-readiness. According to our common way of thinking and assessing it seems absurd and tasteless to bring our feelings of "national enthusiasm" seriously into connection with these reactions of the apes. However, there is good reason to believe that both here and there the same nerve-mechanisms are at work. National enthusiasm – which often precedes wars – is a phenomenon which can hardly be explained by "sensible" processes of thinking.

The same is true, very generally, for the contagious effect of masses on the individual: of customs and fashions, pillages and celebrations, carnival and so on. Here there is a certain appeal to layers of our "subconscious", whereby the persons involved cannot give a clear account. A "mood" is created within them. The actions of others urge them to actions of their own.

These are only few examples. Our behaviour might be directed through innate responses to specific key stimuli to a much larger degree than we ourselves would like to admit.

As far as the drives are concerned the correspondence is even more distinct. Hunger, thirst, the sexual drive – but also display patterns, aggression and fear find their expression with us just as in the animal. Through our conscious thought processes and through our awareness of the self these drives collide with other forms of making decisions. What is more, they have lost in "precision"; they make us uneasy without always showing in what direction they urge us. Mechanisms that work precisely with animals became certain "dark urges" with humans, as Goethe put it. If they do not find appropriate situations and stimuli where they can be worked off, they will "jump to other tracks". Freud pointed this out with regard to the sexual drive which, if it does not find a normal expression, can "sublimate" itself in a completely different activity – for instance in art.

Humans have great troubles with the also innate and strongly developed aggression-drive¹¹. With our ancestors who lived in groups it had a high biological value. Fights among one’s own species made sure that those belonging to one species were spread very evenly over the available acquisition area – an advantage for the species. Subsequently such fights served to determine the strongest and thus the building of a hierarchy. This was very important for the determination of the most capable one who was to lead the herd. In the process of mating the strongest and most capable males were preferred, got the females and consequently were privileged in reproduction. Within the civilised human community this drive, which still appears completely out of our control, cannot be fulfilled properly. Strained atmospheres and irritation without cause, often arguments and a divorce are the consequences. Football games, races and thrillers often provide a "substitutional situation" in order to work off those "impulses".

In humans the curiosity drive became particularly important. From the viewpoint of the humanities, which try to investigate the self from the perspective of the self, it was hardly possible to consider human curiosity as occupying an even more special place than our aesthetic and ethical ideas.

This drive is characteristic of all intelligent animals. To them only part of the necessary behavioural patterns is innate, the rest they acquire in their personal interaction with the environment – during their youth. During that period the curiosity drive – also called the play instinct – urges them to an active exploration and testing of themselves. Every kitten and every child clearly displays the effectiveness of this instinct. "Playing" is nothing other than a restless collecting of experience and a purposeful trying out of every movement one can think of.

With animals this instinct wears off with sexual maturity. The animal then has to acquire all the skills it needs. With humans – and this is where the essential difference lies – this is not the case. We remain interested in the "new" until old age. Humans remain "cosmopolitan" as Gehlen called it¹².

The curiosity instinct was an important prerequisite for the development of human beings – for the development of the energons build by humans. This "germ cell" maintains its playful willingness to try out new things – to build new behavioural patterns and structural blueprints. While every animal remains tied to a specific biosphere, humans conquer and create new biospheres. By adding artificial organs to their bodies, by merging with others into multiply organised complexes they build ever new and ever more powerful energons. Now the mental power of humans is extended into old age; the more important it is that we maintain the readiness and the urge to use those forces for ever new experiments.

The curiosity instinct has considerably advanced the second stage of evolution. The individual steps of progress may well have been intellectual achievements. Yet, behind them was the innate urge to activate and develop that same intelligence and to induce it to try out new possibilities. Even the game with thoughts and imaginations, full with relish as it is, the "making of plans" and "building of castles in the air" may have been "fuelled" by this driving force.

This force is particularly clearly manifested within research, exploring and the spirit of adventure. In daily life it shows itself when humans stop to look whenever they happen to come across something "unusual"; when athletes test themselves with new tasks; when we read and talk much more than is actually necessary; when we are magically attracted by theatre, cinema and television; in short, when the interaction with something new bestows us with positive feelings until old age.

With that we have reached an important point. With animals we can only assume that every gratification of an urge gives them pleasurable feelings – with ourselves we know for sure.

If we satisfy our hunger, our thirst, our sexual drive, our craving for admiration, our drive for aggression, then this gives us pleasure. These positive feelings – originally a necessary addition –consciously thinking humans made the centre of their interests. For a long time we have ceased to eat merely in order to supply ourselves with energy and substances; instead we prepare our meals in such a way that they are "tasty" and thus give greater pleasure. The same is true for drinks. The process of breathing is used for pleasure through smoking. The sexual relationship – for its own sake – and the search for beauty – for its own sake – became centres of our culture. The pleasures which attending to the brood gives have become the centres of family pleasure at home. The satisfaction to be somebody, to be admired, to stand above others physically, mentally, as concerns power, and culturally, to be liked, to impress others, is one of the central forces for the human striving for progress.

The production of pleasure and displeasure to which we are indebted for such rich "emotional lives" is the actual mechanism which advances evolution – and accordingly must have already developed very early on. It is also a function which has to be tied to appropriate vehicles of effect. What these are like in detail we do not yet know. With multi-cellular animals this skill is rooted in the central nervous system. Most innate modes of behaviour are "rewarded" with side-phenomena which the animals strives for; if they are not fulfilled they are "punished" by those which it seeks to avoid. Even with plants there may exist similar – just not observable – "correlates".

Humans, aware of themselves, strive for sensations which bring "pleasure" for their own sake, they even breed them. The "inventories of drives" are not the same for everybody. In one person a particular drive is developed more strongly, in another a different drive is stronger and when it is fulfilled provides more satisfaction, joy, luck, pleasure – or whatever we call it. After all, all these positive feelings that are within reach of humans are motivating forces for the building of energons. If they could be removed – for instance through drugs – then the boundless scaffold of our progress would collapse like a house of cards.

And this is not only because the actual impulse to make an effort would be lost but also because for all exchanging energons (and most them are of this kind) the distinction between pleasure and displeasure forms their essential basis. Without demand there is no sale – and without pleasure-displeasure mechanisms there is no demand.

Already during the first phase of evolution this addition to the instincts was a decisive function. In the second stage of evolution it became – in two respects – the prerequisite for further development.

However, only a few human impulses derive from innate patterns of behaviour. There are just as many that derive from acquired behaviour which influences us via upbringing, tradition and our own experience. What we call "habit" is a phenomenon that is quite similar to the instincts. Roughly speaking, habits can be called "acquired instincts"¹³.

Once habits are formed – this will be known by everybody from their own experience – they exert pressure on us. If we have become accustomed to particular life habits, then they call for repetition and produce uneasiness and even pain if we have to do without them. If we are used to tasty food, alcohol or cigarettes, our will has for a long time not been free any more as we repeatedly strive for the feelings which they create in us.

Here, too, the eminent significance of the human "imagination" is evident. Also mentally we can form "habits": plans and wishes which are rooted in us and get a hold can produce considerable feelings of displeasure, if they are not continued. This is the case with all "illusions" that one has to give up.

The drive of human curiosity is, as it were, the antagonist to habits. While the latter urge us into well-worn ways of behaviour, the curiosity instinct campaigns for abandoning them. This interplay was an important prerequisite for the development of human energons. On the one hand it was important that what had once been achieved was maintained and consolidated: this is the conservative tendency. On the other hand it was no less important that at least a few broke away from the already existing, who got rid of self-created ties and ventured into new territory.

Just like instincts, habits, too, produce feelings of pleasure and displeasure: the former, if we indulge them and the latter, if we are hindered from doing so. Even more crucial than the building of habits within an individual, however, are the "habits" of communities. We call them: ethics, custom, tradition, culture. These common habits remain in existence over generations, even over centuries. Established doctrines also belong to them: for instance religions and ideologies. They influence – as fixed rules of life – the actions of individual human beings and thus make them unfree. On the other hand they save them making their own decisions and provide feelings of safety, security, satisfaction and pleasure.

On particular days particular celebrations take place. The main points in human lives: success, marriage, birth, pleasure, death to a large degree occur in the wake of common habits. They are also rigid and urge the individual into particular directions. They, too, just like the instincts, "reward" and "punish". They, too, make our will unfree.

The phenomenon of "imprinting" in humans also plays an important role. Freud proved that. He found out that "sensitive phases" in early childhood are responsible for outward influences gaining the power to mould and thus determine the behavioural structure of humans in their future lives in important aspects.

Therefore the human child between the first and third year of its life needs a grown-up partner to which it can attach emotionally – "psychologically". Normally this is the mother, yet, it can also be other persons. If the child is deprived of the "stimuli-situation" – as can for instance be the case with hospitalised children when the nurses often change – then this has harmful influences for life. The formation of the "original faith" is prevented and the children – unless they die anyway – will appear "unsociable" in their further lives¹⁴.

Between the third and the fifth year of life – Freud called this span the "Oedipal period" – the sexual behaviour in the future is influenced and even determined. According to the results of psychoanalysis the influence of the environment – especially of the parents – can cause sexual disturbances, and also homosexuality, in future life.

During puberty children form their ethical ideals. What is imprinted during that time, they can hardly ever completely overcome in their future lives. Also in that "sensitive period" the nerve structures that are built are obviously influenced lastingly.

With animals imprintings are "irreversible" – they cannot be corrected later in life. A rooster that is imprinted for female ducks can never again be induced to love-actions with a chicken. With humans – not least thanks to intellectual achievements – this fixation is less rigid. Here, too, irreversible alignments or damage to the control of behaviour can occur but many problems can be moderated or even corrected through appropriate "treatments". However, it can no longer be disputed that with humans as well as with animals the same connections of effects exist.

Especially interesting is the phenomenon of the "innate dispositions to learn". Chaffinches – but also other kinds of birds, for instance nightingales – choose among different kinds of singing the one that belongs to their own species. With such animals the ability to decide upon what they prefer to learn is genetically manifested.

Does this phenomenon also still exist in humans? Does it also explain tendencies in our behaviour?

This is new territory for future investigations. It is striking that with many nations – completely independent from each other – similar behavioural structures have developed. Let us consider a very general one: the human predilection for ceremonies, for regular orderings and sequences of events. As order is such an important tool for human progress, the shaping of such innate tendencies would without doubt have supported the balance – thus it would have had a "positive selection value".

It is not impossible that certain guidelines as to what they should preferably learn are innate in humans, also.

Lorenz talked about a "parliament of instincts" which is a very concrete comparison. Together with the acquired drives, called "habits", they raise their voices, as it were, inside the control centre and the respectively strongest "member of parliament" is successful and takes over – or influences – the control of the body¹⁵.

The "I" that is aware of itself – which in humans came to be the "highest" unit of control – seen from that perspective becomes a mere dogsbody¹⁶. It uses its skills in order to satisfy hunger, to win a sexual partner, to gain pleasure through success, to satisfy habits and to conform with society’s norms. We say: " I am free". If we "want", we can take a step to the right or to the left, nothing in the world can prohibit that. If we consider ourselves – or other people – over a longer period of time, then this "freedom" shrinks considerably.

Depending on his or her "equipment" with innate or acquired drives, the life of a person takes this or that direction, behind the "will" there are many effective forces.

It is true that principally, of course, the "I" has the possibility to obtain control of all those forces – like horses that are harnessed in front of a carriage. That control does not have to consist in suppressing them but can make use of them so that a personal, self-built steering-principle co-ordinates all those forces and "brings them into harmony"¹⁷.

A person who achieves that – from the human viewpoint – can be called "free". His or her total co-ordination has been created by him or herself. His or her will, in this sense, is "free".

From the viewpoint of evolution as a whole, however, this freedom remains dubious. For the strongest motor of life development, the principle of pleasure and displeasure, cannot be overcome even by those people. Even with ascetics who forbid themselves any kind of pleasure and who force themselves to intensive displeasure, it remains questionable whether they are not made in a such way such it is precisely that which makes them happy and satisfied. Through domestication and the connection with our conscious thinking human drives became very complex. Almost every tendency can connect to positively tinged inner experiences, hence with "emotions" ultimately worth striving for.

With regard to the life flow parts of this growing complication were advantageous, others were not. We now turn back to a more distant perspective: to development of the whole.

The most powerful energons which ever came into existence were the so-called "states".
 
 

Back to the Table of Contents

Continue to "The four shapes of the state"
 
 

Comments:

¹ In particular G. Berkeley, John Locke and David Hume (between 1670 and 1770), but also Kant and Schopenhauer held this opinion.
² Pascal formulated it in a wonderful way: “If reasons are falling apart, one often calls on one’s feelings.”
³ Goethe had already  expressed his view that examinations should not commence from the top, trying to find humans in the animal, but should  start from the basis and  rediscover the more primitive animal in humans.
(In: “Lectures on the first three chapters of the draft: A general introduction to comparative anatomy, on the basis of osteology”, 1796)
⁴ Especially revealing is his work “Ganzheit und Teil in der tierischen und menschlichen Gemeinschaft” (1950), included in the collection “Über tierisches und menschliches Verhalten”, München 1965.
⁵ This for instance is true for the widely read book by D. Morris “The Naked Ape”, Munich 1968.
⁶ One example for instance is the threatening of stags. They lift their lips and thus expose their canine teeth – which, however, have for a long time not been weapons any more. They are recessive, while relatives – for instance the muntjak – still has dagger--like eye teeth at its disposal. Here the co-ordination of the movements remained intact longer than the organ to which they relate. Another example: during the mating foreplay male cuckoos give material for the building of a nest to the female – more precisely: they perform the typical movements for that (without actually taking material for the building of a nest into their beaks). The co-ordination of movements still derives from the ancestors who built nests – thus, it refers to the common building of an artificial organ. Since the cuckoo is a  parasite who has other birds brood the eggs and thus does not build its own nest any more, the latter has become superfluous. The co-ordination of movements, however, was maintained and even acquired a new meaning  in the ritual of the mating ceremony – an example of a change of function.
⁷ Some people presume that our predilection for smooth, flawless surfaces, for instance spotlessly painted walls, can also be explained with regard to that root. This is an example for the kind of conclusion drawn so frequently today. It  is not impossible that such a connection  in fact exists –  but it is only an assumption. Other roots may have no less influence: for instance the urge for tidiness which is strongly developed with animals and also still exists with humans.
⁸ What is meant here are only basic elements of assessment. Undoubtedly, the human sense of beauty is also to a large extent influenced by upbringing and tradition.
⁹ Some people will at this point raise the objection that there are also humans who do not show this reaction. But this means little: the strength of single instincts and instinct residua is quite variable in humans and there also exist – especially since medicine tries to maintain all life – a high number of “abnormalities”. Here only very general tendencies are illustrated which are clearly backed up by statistics.
¹⁰ Naturally, intelligence and personal assessments can intensify, decrease or even completely prevent such reactions. What is crucial here is not the actual mode of behaviour but the surging “impulse” which puts us into a specific “mood” and urges our action.
¹¹ K. Lorenz wrote about this  in detail in “Das sogenannte Böse”, Vienna 1966.
¹² A. Gehlen, “Der Mensch”, Berlin 1940.
¹³ Already Aristoteles called them the human being’s “second nature”.
¹⁴ Details can be found in R. A. Spitz, “Hospitalism”, Internat. Univ. Press, New York 1945, and in J. Bowlby, “Maternal Care and Mental Health”, World Health Organ., Monogr. Ser. 2 1952.
¹⁵ Already Spinoza recognised that. He wrote that a desire which is only related to one or a few body-parts “does not consider its usefulness for  the whole human being” (Ethik IV, 60).
¹⁶ Schopenhauer called the intellect a “servant of the desires”.
¹⁷ Into that overall co-ordination the willingness for change has certainly to be incorporated. Somebody whose principles are “in charge” of them is not the “rider” anymore. Due to the fact that world development remains in a constant flux, a harmony that is “perfect” (the optimum one) for humans – which depending on their inventory of drives and on the environment can be very different – in most cases cannot remain completely untouched by changes.