In business the importance of a function is expressed by the size of the remuneration that it brings in. By far the highest salaries (plus additional benefits) are for the top achievements – today they are those of managers. Within a state it is just the same. The most highly paid posts are held by the most senior management.

If one asks what is the most important function in the body of an animal or of a plant, the answer is far more difficult. Here the single organs and tissues are not acquired on the market and what is more, almost every part is vital. At any rate, the genetic blueprint of the nucleus – with higher animals – and in the central nervous system are of particular importance. The genetic blueprint is responsible for the construction of the body while the central nervous system is responsible for its effective movement. Even if the term "value" can only be used in the sense of more or less minor replacing, there is no doubt that the directing units have special significance for organisms also. What is more, they are by far the most complicated and the most subtly differentiated functional units.

If we look at ourselves there can hardly be any doubt – according to our subjective feeling – about our most important unit. The phenomenon that is central and significant for us is our "I": our thinking and feeling. It is practically the true precondition for our real existence. Our bodies may well be present without us being – just as with somebody who is mentally completely deranged – but an actual "I" does not exist in that case.

According to old, traditional ideas the "I" coincides to a large degree with the "soul" (or with the "spirit" in a metaphysical sense) and many people see in that something that is immaterial or only partly material¹. In numerous religious concepts the "I" is immortal, so that everything apart from it is some sort of skin into which the "I" temporarily slips. According to the concept of Buddhism the "I" even successively gives a soul to a number of such bodily skins and is furthermore able to retain individual memories in the course of the "transmigration of souls". From the scientific point of view the awareness of the self is a function of our cerebral cortex. Yet, here too, there has hardly been any doubt that this function constitutes the actual centre of the phenomenon "human being".

The theory of the energon, in contrast, relentlessly comes to the conclusion (which for many people appears to be the most absurd aspect of this theory) that also every directing structure – thus also our "I" – is merely a functional unit like the rest, hence by no means centre and lord but instead also only a servant. The true "lord" always is and remains the structure that is aligned to the acquisition of energy. That structure can – at least in some cases – perform its work without a central management. However, there are never any processes of control without an expenditure of power: no matter whether this consists of a process of movement or of resistance. Without energy nothing exists eventually: neither matter nor movement – according to Einstein’s theory not even time and space could exist.

The theory of the energon draws a highly curious picture of the human "I": the germ cell human being has attained such a superiority and has liberated himself/herself from all bounds that had previously been restricting the process of life so that the acquisition of energy – the central phenomenon – became self-evident, as it were. A completely different problem came into the foreground: what is supposed to happen with the surpluses? Here the unit in control – used to controlling – seized the reins. It considered itself as end in itself and makes vile energy seemingly into a servant. Everything has to follow its dictates, it becomes the king. It glorifies itself, pities itself, enraptures itself or despairs – a servant who all of a sudden has gained the riches of the master and now hardly knows how to make use of them.

Has such a development actually taken place? Furthermore, how did it take such a course?
 
 

The second "inner front" constitutes the sole subject area of a young science, very much in the sense of the energon theory. Cybernetics as it was founded by the mathematician and technician Norbert Wiener investigates the phenomena of steering from the viewpoint of their functions. It is deemed to be secondary whether nerves or wires, ganglion cells, humans or electronic units are involved; the essence is to be seen in the effect and the question to be asked rather generally is: what do the units have to be like in order to achieve a steering effect?

From the point of view of the energon theory the term "steering" ("cybernetics" is derived from the Greek word for "helmsman") is not quite appropriate for the totality of this problem. This circle of functions is principally concerned with the linking of sequences of movements, with their "co-ordination". In the most simple case that is not yet any "steering" in the actual sense of the word. Therefore I call the second inner front "coordination"

In contrast to the "bond" this inner demand does not concern all functional units – but only those that have processes of movements as their functions. The thorns of a rosebush or the stack of a factory for instance do their "duties" in an entirely passive way. The thorns prevent herbivores in their activity, the stack directs the smoke in one particular direction. Movements of their own are not necessary for these functions – therefore nor is any co-ordination with other movements.

However, neither does every actively working functional unit have to be co-ordinated with the activity of another one. This for instance can be seen with the nematocystes of the coral polyps that have already been discussed. If they are touched by an alien element, they shoot off their arrows – no matter how the rest of the body is occupied just then.

With the six legs of an insect the situation is different. For those functional units it is not sufficient to carry out isolated movements. In order to produce the required function – namely to move the insect’s body – a certain defined linking with the movements of the other legs is required – furthermore also with the sensory perception of the eyes.

What follows is that whilst every functional unit has to be connected to its energon, not every functional unit has to be co-ordinated with the others. Thus, the second inner front only affects some functional units – but it is no less significant, though. On the contrary: no other factor has imposed more complicated equipment on the energons that this one in particular².
 
 

How is it actually possible – in general terms – that two functional units are co-ordinated with each other concerning their movements? What additional equipment is required?

Without doubt, there has to be a signal flowing from one functional unit to the other, a command by which joint action is obtained. This results in the necessity of at least four fundamentally different functional structures.

First, there has to be a mediating something in order to convey the signal. Secondly, the signal itself is necessary. Thirdly, one of the functional units has to possess a transmitting installation that can send out the signal. Fourthly, the other functional unit needs to have a "recipient" who "understands" it. The latter gains special significance if there are different signals flowing across from one functional unit to the other one.

First: the mediating something. In cybernetics this is called "transmission channel". This expression is appropriate if we think of the signals produced by the hormones in the bloodstream. These messenger substances are secreted by a gland in one place and trigger off a certain effect in a different place. In that case the signal appears as a chemical substance and moves, together with the bloodstream inside the tube system of the blood circulation – in fact, they really move in a "transmission channel". If, however, the signals have the form of electric impulses which are transmitted via a wire, the notion of the "channel" does not seem to be quite as appropriate any more. A wire is not hollow. If the signal is a word that is spoken by one person and heard by another one, then "transmission" is even more inappropriate. In that case the mediating something is the air. The most inappropriate use of that term occurs if the transmission of the signal – for instance with a machine – is carried out via a lever. Such a lever does not have anything in common with a "channel". Therefore, in the energon theory I am going to call that transmitting, mediating something the "transmission medium".

Let us stay with the air in which the sound waves of the voice travel (in a vacuum no sound can travel). It does not cost anything for the energons operating on earth, for it is simply there. Thus, in that case the air – for the time of the transmission of the sound – becomes a device aiding the communicating persons. Here a favourable environmental condition is temporarily roped to the effect-structure of the energon.

If chemical signals travel inside the cell through the cell-liquid, then the cell-liquid – in extension of its function – becomes the "transmission medium". Here, too, no additional effort is required – a unit that already exists takes on another duty. With the transmission of signals through nerves or telephone wires, however, additional units are the prerequisites: precisely those nerves and wires. Consequently, in that case a corresponding burden for the energy balance exists³.

Secondly: the signals. In cybernetics they are called "vehicles of communication" or "vehicles of information". One could not choose better expressions. According to the theory of the energon they are also vehicles of effect (or functional units). With verbal communication they appear in the shape of sounds, words and sentences. With written communication they appear in characters that are ordered correspondingly. As for telegraphic transmission only three units (long impulse, short impulse, pause) are needed to convey the content of what is to be transmitted. It was the achievement of cybernetics to make that content – called "information" – mathematically ascertainable. Today information is measured in "bits".⁴

The development of simple signals can easily be followed in animals. If a peacock, for instance, opens its fan, it transmits a certain "statement" to others of the same species and triggers off certain reactions (with males it is intimidation, with females the willingness for a sexual approach). With such signals – which above all play an important role as identifying features between beings of the same species and between sexual partners – it can be determined what features a signal must have in order to be effective.

There are two of these: every signal has to be as striking as possible – in order to be well perceptible. Secondly, it also should be as unusual as possible – so that it cannot be mistaken for other sensory impressions. If we find very complicated and unusual signals (you may for instance think of the body colours, the ceremonies of performing the courtship display or of threatening) of animals – especially in areas where many different species can be found – then this is explained by the importance of avoiding misunderstandings. Here also we recognise an evolutionary steering mechanism at work. Animals with signals easy to misunderstand became disadvantaged, on the other hand those with succinct and precise signals made their way in life more successfully.

Thirdly: the transmitting vehicle of effect. It has to be capable of sending signals on their way via the transmission medium. In some cases it is possible that such a transmitter is unnecessary as it can simply be an extension of the function of another functional unit. An example would be the male robin whose coloured throat has a threatening effect on competing males. The special colouring of the throat – by extension of its function – becomes a signal. A special transmitter is not necessary any more: instead, outside energy is utilised. The rays of light that are travelling through space anyway are reflected by the throat and reach – completely independently – the eyes, that is the receivers of other males. For the sending of sound signals, on the other hand, special sound-transmitting functional units are necessary: with grasshoppers it is a special shaping of the hind legs and the wings, with us humans it is the vocal chords. For the transmission of written messages (for instance through a letter) the additional units needed here are a vehicle for writing (e. g. paper) and writing utensils. Transmission via telegraph or radio requires a channel.

Now we already have very differing structures (red throat, vocal chords, pencil, radio channel) which have to be seen as belonging to the same group, according to their functions. A cybernetician is interested in the joint fundamental technical principle underlying them. From the viewpoint of the energon theory, on the other hand, what is of interest is the burden of the balance that is caused by the same functions – thus the "expenditure", the costs.

Double functions and extension of functions complicate functional assessment. Accordingly, the robin’s red throat is both signal and transmitter – two very different functions coincide in one and the same functional unit. With the peacock the feathers not only have a special colouring but they are also correspondingly enlarged: this is an extension of the feathers covering the roots of the tail by which both the transmission and the signal effects are intensified. What is more, that garland of feathers can be folded up – this is a consequence of the conflicting functions of the signalling effect on the one hand and the activity of acquisition on the other hand. The open fan would be a hindrance for the catching of prey and would also be too clear a sign of recognition for enemies. Furthermore it is conducive to the signalling effect if the signal is only sent out at the very moment when it should be transmitted. Thus it becomes more striking for the recipient. This shows how manifold correlations contribute to the evolutionary forming of physical units and their ways of moving.

With human communication via technical aids "interference" become an important factor. If electric impulses run along a wire, they weaken with the growing distance. Then the disruptions that occur in the conductor become more crucial and the discernibility of the signal gradually declines. The solution for that problem is called a "relay" and "amplifier-chain". The signal is forced to imprint the same information on a new and stronger flow of electricity. That trick in particular drew the technicians' attention to the causality of steering. In this process not the slightest part of the signal’s energy goes into the continuing flow of electricity. It merely steers the latter’s impulses.

As regards the transmitting unit what is interesting in that process is that for the intensification of the effect further signals – co-operative ones so to speak – are switched in as the signal proceeds.
 
 

Fourthly: the receiver.

Here, too, it is possible that one functional unit is unnecessary – that is, if the signal itself directly becomes the stimulus which triggers of a corresponding reaction with the receiving unit. With chemical messenger substances which are at work inside the cells and between cells (especially with hereditary processes and developmental processes) mostly there exist such immediate effects. There the vehicle of the signal itself is the trigger of a chemical reaction.

If, however, the receiver has sense organs which respond to more than one stimulus, then the problem is the following one: how does the receiver manage to recognise one certain signal (or even several) among different stimuli? The receiving unit then functionally takes the part of a "filter" which each time only "lets through" certain combinations of stimuli – which then trigger off one or the other form of behaviour.

Such mechanisms of "recognition" were experimentally proven in numerous types of animals. If they are innate (thus if they are constructed by the genetic blueprint), they are called ITM – "innate triggering mechanisms".⁵ They are units that are specialised in the receiving of signals – more precisely: in data processing – training of animals shows that similar mechanisms of "recognition" can be constructed in the process of learning and practising. In that case inside the central nervous system there are such "fillers" artificially constructed which select certain sensory impressions from the abundance of the ones that are perceived – whereupon there follows a reaction that is also trained.

With humans the "comprehension" of sentences builds a comparable achievement of the brain. Words and sentences are also signals. They also have to be selected from the variety of other perceptions and have to be recognised in their meanings. They also trigger off – inside our brains – certain defined reactions: the "comprehension of the meaning", the "understanding". Our intelligent action is constructed by a number of those single achievements involving data processing which is to a degree extremely complicated.
 
 

The more important the communication (information, report, order) inside the body of effect of an energon is, the more important it is that the respective signal is "understood" in the right way, namely that it leads to the appropriate reaction. This results in another functional problem, that is that of control.

Practically this means that the whole process is reversed. If for instance an order goes from A to B, the control report has to go back from B to A. That requires – in principle – four further necessary units: a sender on the end of the receiver, a receiver on the end of the sender, a transmitting medium (it may be the same one or not) and corresponding signals. This laborious process opened up a significant constructive possibility. Such reports back, as you will see, can be used for the direct correction of the orders that are sent out (in biology this is called the "reafferential principle").

Just as with the relay, the signal can imprint its impulse on another stream of energy, so the report back to the commander can be used in order to "steer" the placing of orders accordingly. The principle of the causality of steering also appears in this context. Nothing of the back-report’s energy is transferred to the stream of energy of the command. It only steers it.

A concrete example for such a "control circuit" is the thermostat in a refrigerator. In the simplest case the commanding unit is a thermometer. If its mercury scale goes up (approximately to + 4 C), it closes an electrical circuit – and the cooling machine starts to work. Consequently, the temperature inside the refrigerator drops, the mercury scale drops – and the electrical circuit is interrupted. The cooling machine stops. Now the temperature goes up again, the mercury scale goes up ... closes the electrical circuit: the cooling machine works again. By that the temperature "automatically" stays constant within narrow limits.

In that case the report back to the commander is carried out by the air in the fridge. The heat – also for free – functions as the signal. The air makes the mercury scale go up; the cooling machine is turned on. This is how the feedback steers the commander. If the temperature drops, this forms a different report back – which causes the turning off of the cooling machine. This correlation of effects is called "feedback". Thus the commander becomes a sort of jumping jack which merely reacts according to the back-report’s way of pulling the strings. This is also an extension of the function: the back-report additionally takes over the task of steering.

Both in technology and in the bodies of organisms such self-regulating steering plays an important role.

Within the human body this is the way the body temperature is kept within narrow limits – also the blood pressure and the blood sugar level. With breathing a "control circuit" entering intrudes on our consciousness: if it goes up, then the commander "centre of respiration" is activated and the latter triggers off respiratory reactions. Thereupon – as a result of the breathing process – the CO₂-content of the blood drops and for several seconds no order is placed by the centre of respiration. As we are able to influence the respiration movements at will, everybody is able to observe the effectiveness of the back-report themselves. If we stop breathing deliberately, we feel how the urge to breathe becomes more and more intense, how the steering effect of the back-reports increasingly urges us to a breathing movement.

b) Through the mediating functional unit C (centre) the necessary "lines" are diminished considerably. (According to Stefanic-Allmayer.)
 

Within businesses and inside state organisations control circuits also play important roles. There we do not find cells or switching elements which are joined in a self-acting correlation of effects, but instead we find human beings who think and feel. The principle, however, is not changed. There are also controlling back-reports that result in a changing of the orders. If those orders are given by a human being, he becomes a jumping jack just like the thermometer in the refrigerator or as the commanding respiration centre inside our spinal cord. A human is also not really responsible for the orders it gives. It is the respective back-report which triggers off one or the other command – and by which the human is thus steered.
 
 

Figure 28 shows the functional advantage of a centre for instance with the telephone network. Already with merely 50 or 100 subscribers it would require an enormous wire mesh if every subscriber had to be connected to every other one directly. If on the contrary a mediating unit is inserted, then one wire to every subscriber suffices.

In lower animals – for example medusas – we find diffuse nets of nerves running through the body. In the course of higher development increasingly stronger centralisation sets in (Fig. 29). The reasons for that, however, are not as simple as with centralisation in the telephone system.

From the beginning onwards the centre in construction (the "brain") had to achieve more than merely to mediate. It took over – in a merging of functions – the assessment of the reports arriving from the senses on the one hand, on the other hand it took over the placing of co-ordinated orders for working organs (limbs, feeding organs, glands, etc.). For each of these two achievements additional units (secondary functional units) were necessary: the behavioural blueprints that have already been mentioned frequently in this book. On the one hand the central nervous system needed patterns of recognition: that is, appropriate guidelines for the combinations of stimuli which the individual has to look for among the variety of sensory impressions streaming in. On the other hand it needed blueprints for the giving of orders: instructions for appropriately co-ordinated orders to the working organs, especially to the "muscles".

The actual activity of mediating consists in the appropriate combining of "sensory" and "motor" achievements. If the brain perceives a certain combination of stimuli ("key stimuli", "trigger"), then this has to bring about a certain defined "reaction", a certain defined series of movements, that is, the activation of a certain defined motor blueprint.

If such behaviour blueprints are innate, then the joining is genetically determined and the reaction takes place "automatically". The simplest example are "direct reflexes" – which still exist in humans, too. Accordingly, with the perception of bright light for instance our pupils close "of their own accord". Here a certain sensory perception is strictly coupled to the placing of orders to the respective muscles (namely those which cause the changing of the pupil). We find something similar also with by far more complicated "behaviour".

A certain defined stimulating situation – which can also be provided for animals in an experiment – then triggers off a certain specific behaviour in the animal. With many animals for instance the perception of the highly complicated performing of the courtship display (and only precisely then) triggers off a no less highly complicated series of movements of the animal, which results in copulation⁶.

A further achievement of the central nervous system appears, if the innate behaviour blueprints are changed or refined through individual experience. This additional ability can for instance be seen in the young toad.

Instinctively this animal first of all snaps at every small body in quick movement. A blueprint of recognition responds to that rather general "key stimulus" and triggers off the motor order of pouncing and snapping (thus co-ordinated orders to numerous different muscle groups). If, however, the young toad gets to an insect which stings it, then this sensory impression is associated with the innate behaviour. Practically this means: the young toad remembers the unpleasant experience and if it again meets a "small, quickly moving body" with similar features, then it does not pounce at it and snap at it any more. The "switchboard" of innate reactions is then extended by an additional unit, it changes, improves, becomes "more differentiated". The great advantage of this ability is obvious. The behaviour becomes less mechanical. The energon (in this case the toad) is thus able to "adjust" its innate behaviour to the individual environmental conditions in a better way.

That increase in achievement goes still further, if experiences can be saved very generally without already having determined how they should serve the energon in the future. It is only the ability to go beyond mere "association" that is called the "power of recollection". The precondition for this is a new functional unit (inside the central nervous system): a "registration of experiences", a "depository of "memories". Generally we call that unit "memory".⁷

That functional unit has to perform two not exactly simple tasks: first, the variety of incoming sensory reports has to be "processed" appropriately, has to be classified in respective "categories", or figuratively: it has to be put into the respective intellectual drawers. Secondly, that stored empirical treasure, that "knowledge", also has to remain accessible – this means that if the requirement, that is the corresponding situation, arises, those experiences have to be available to the central nervous system, it has to be able to find them again.

With the hydra, which is fixed to one place, the single parts of the body are connected to each other through a diffuse net of co-ordinating units (nerve fibres). – With the swirl-worm a centralisation of the vehicles of co-ordination is already discernible. Four longitudinal stems are connected to each other by ring-like links. The two which are situated ventrally (drawn in the picture) are more strongly developed and end in an accumulation of nerve cells at their front ends which forms a still rather simple "brain". – With the palolo-worm the longitudinal stems are closer together and where they are connected by crosswise links ("comissures") further accumulations of nerve cells ("ganglia") have developed. – With the honey-bee the ganglia cells are concentrated at two points. – With humans the brain and the spinal cord are the steering centres for the conscious and unconscious outputs of the nerves.
 

With higher animals both abilities are already provable. With humans they were increased to the extent that we can label the single "drawers of concepts" with words. An animal is only able to form "non-verbal" concepts. Our thought processes, however, are to a large degree based on the far clearer subdivision which is constituted by words.

That new unit – the memory – not only enables higher developed animals to alter the innate blueprints correspondingly but also to supplement and to refine them. Moreover, they can assemble individual blueprints out of the innate basic units – or create completely new ones ("learning animals").

The particular significance of the human "imagination" has already been stressed (see Part one, chapter 7). Similar to an inner projection screen our brain compares the contents of our consciousness and the central nervous system is thus able to construct "plans" – they could be called theoretical behavioural blueprints. What is more – since humans form communities and communicate verbally –by no means only one’s own experiences are at the disposal of the combinatory game of "thoughts". In the course of our upbringing an enormous amount of experience gained by others leaves its mark on us – and that, too, becomes "building material" for such experiments in combination.
 
 

More than that:

Since the functional unit "imagination" is able to combine every content of an experience with any other, it can also include the concept of one’s own person in that combinatory game. In my opinion it is precisely which constitutes the phenomenon called "I-consciousness". So humans have the possibility – by means of a special functional unit – to distance themselves from themselves, that is to "objectivate" themselves – thus to see themselves as an "object". According to that concept our "I" is just the activity of that projection screen, the function of that special functional unit. It is the sum total of our thoughts and of the feelings which we are "made aware of" by them. That coincides with Descartes’ "Cogito ergo sum" – I think, therefore I am⁸.

Even the highest animals lack that projection screen(or at least one that is as efficient). We possess it, on the contrary – and thus also a "consciousness" and an "I". That "I" however – how could it be otherwise? – is a centre of its own and views everything from that centre. It builds – necessarily – the notion that the rest of the body is like a skin which surrounds that "I" and which is possessed by that "I". So in this sense we say my body, my eyes, my hands.

According to the energon theory this is a set thought pattern and maybe the first one that humans acquired. Our "I" is according to that point of view only one among numerous functions – the activity of one functional unit inside the germ cell human being.
 
 

With all professional bodies build by that "I" it is still the central nervous system of the human being in question which steers all functional units: also the artificial organs. Whether it is a pick or a pencil, a draught animal or for payment, appropriate behavioural blueprints are always necessary in order to build those additional units into the body of effect and to enable their efficient use. The "handling" of the whole professional body, of all its units has to be "trained".

Even more: also the use of collective organs – more precisely: their temporary installation into one's own structure of effects – requires acquired behavioural blueprints as a precondition. We also have to learn how to "use" the courts, the post office or a circus. We are used to looking at the relationship differently. Yet, from the viewpoint of the energon it has to be assessed in this way. Very generally it is true that for every additional functional unit which is not inbuilt and even if it is a million times larger than we ourselves and we only enlist it occasionally there are appropriate behavioural blueprints (of recognition, of movement and of a combination of the two) required which are artificially built into our brains. Only if we have them are they "potentially" at our disposal⁹.

However, already with professional entities some functions of the central nervous system leave the genetic body. The working person takes notes – thus the storage of memories is shifted to the artificial organ of paper. Within the framework of our planning activities we make sketches, count, write – these are functions aiding the making of a plan where the vehicles are already separated from our bodies.

With businesses that process is carried even further. The steering unit here is not only one person any more but consists of many people. In bookkeeping memory is stored systematically. With statistical methods it is processed. Computers – purely technical constructions – carry that on and take over control mechanisms.

Here, too, particular departments became specialised in the "building of blueprints". The results of their activities are the respective business-blueprints. From the "I"s that cause their performances an "I" of a higher level of integration is produced, as it were. It is a collective "I" which cannot be explained as the total of all single "I’s" automatically. Even the "I" of the entrepreneur is not one of free decision in that bigger unit but only a part of it. With decisions it not seldom occurs that the "collective I" appears completely autonomous.

It is just the same with state bodies that have representative bodies of people. There, too, the steering structure consists of a multiplicity of thinking and plan-making people where the devised concepts partly originate in the "general opinion", partly in personal beliefs or interests and not least in the power of habits of the community that go far back: tradition. Here, too, a rather abstract "super-ego" arises, which, however, still represents a very efficient reality. Similar to the single "I", this "I" also tends to consider itself as the centre, as the most important unit around which everything else revolves. Not rarely a very complex structure becomes the actual "spirit", the actual "soul" of those energons thereby – and then not rarely rules over the ones who have created it.
 
 

In the co-ordination structures of all energons there occurs one and the same problem. The question is: centralisation or decentralisation? In the end it is always rooted in the same problem: how many active functional units can one unit control?

If one day humans shift the control of their biggest organisations of acquisition to computers – which is not even unlikely – then this problem might go away. For computers work so much faster so that they can control an incomparably higher number of units. Both the cell and humans, however, have to face narrow limits here.

That is the actual reason for hierarchically graded control structures which we see at work in states, businesses and also in the bodies of organisms. They are – in the inner sector "co-ordination" – a functional necessity. They are the consequence of a necessary division of labour, the consequence of the limited capability of the functional units that are available for their control. Additionally, inside those hierarchies another problem – a secondary problem – arises: what can be steered by the highest leadership – and what can be handed over to the "competence" of subordinate functional units?

An example of extreme decentralisation is the genetic blueprint of all multicellular organisms. With each cell division the blueprint is divided also – so that (also with humans) each of the millions and thousands of millions of cells has the whole "genotype" in its nucleus. The "differentiation" of single tissues and organs is based – as it is known today – on a process that is rather curious as regards construction. In each of the manifold specialised cells a part of the genetic make-up is "closed down" as it were. Within the nerve cells only that part works that which is simply aimed at nerve cells. Inside a muscle or a bone the only part that works is the one simply aimed at muscles or bones.

Roughly compared, this amounts to what happens in the construction of a business where everybody involved gets a general plan with all the instructions but where all orders not aimed at them specifically are crossed out.

The most amazing thing is that that obstruction also – necessarily – has to be controlled by the genetic blueprint. Those endless threads of molecules which have the double-functions of both blueprint and steering authority produce – where their orders are not appropriate – their own obstructions.

With all organisms that do not need movements of their own (mainly plants) the solution of extreme decentralisation suffices. Each of the parts – if differentiated – works independently to a large degree. About the plant Goethe said that it was "only an individual in the moment it detaches itself as seed from the mother-plant." Already in the course of putting out shoots it is "a multiplicity". This might seem a bit too extreme in terms of today’s research results – because a slow system of communication via transport of substances and diffusion might tie together all parts loosely. With regard to the difference from the typical animal, however, it hits the essential mark.

Yet, also the central nervous systems of animals are less centralised than many people believe they are. Every innate behavioural steering ("instinct") has some sort of life of its own – Lorenz compared their acting in combination with a "parliament". There the different vehicles of steering "ask to speak", compete to take over the steering of the body alternately or together. Very informative experiments (and not lastly due to artificial stimulation of the brain) succeeded in identifying that highly federalistic situation quite precisely. A "climax of achievement" does not exist in the highest animals either.

Only with humans did such a climax occur – in my opinion through the formation (or stronger unfolding) of our functional unit "imagination". Only the self-aware person has a central authority that is based on experience and thinking. Everybody knows from experience, however, that their power is not all that great.

Innate steering structures in us still have an important position in the parliament of our decisions. The "drives" and also innate norms of reaction exert a strong influence. Far less than one would probably admit to oneself is our "will" really free – in the sense of decisions that are emotionally independent and are based on sober experience.

Yet, also with regard to something else our control is decentralised. If we learn an activity – writing, driving a car, playing the piano – then first this happens with full "attention" (of which we only have one). That means: the inner projection screen is used for that learning process. Once we have acquired the new skill, subordinate centres (on the basis of the blueprints built) take over that task. An adult person by no means has to direct each of his steps consciously. "Completely autonomously" our legs move in such a way that we make way for others in the street, surmount obstacles, climb up stairs. The proficient car driver does not think of stepping on the gas, of braking, of shifting the gears – he can think of something completely different and talk about something completely different at the same time. The pianist plays hundreds of keys per minute – but his/her attention is not aimed at each single finger.

On the inner part of the front "co-ordination" with humans quite a complex picture presents itself. Not the least bit of the steering though our genetic blueprint which is at work in every cell penetrates our consciousness – our "I". In the same way, in our behavioural steering happen many things also happen below the border of consciousness – are carried out decentralised, "autonomously". What is more, even in the actual control centre many decisions come about that are not really controlled by the "I". As in a parliament there are – in the "subconscious" – innate and acquired control mechanisms (the latter are the "habits" in the first place which can urge us as powerfully as the drives) endeavouring to speak. They influence and often really direct the head "will" and prevent a "reason" that is based on experience.

In businesses perfect centralisation has become possible but has proven damaging since it paralyses the initiative of the employees. A certain amount of "freedom of disposition" has proved to be convenient. With particularly successful enterprises in the USA the principle is: "Centralise aims, decentralise decisions." Especially if there are branches spread all over the world it has turned out to be better "if the power of decision-making is as close as possible to the scene of the events".¹⁰

Within a state all too strong centralisation also leads to stagnation and to a burgeoning of bureaucracy. An authoritarian state needs centralisation since it has to rely on continuous control. Just as in times of war or need every state has to be ruled more tightly and in more centralised fashion. In periods of peace and with true democracy, on the contrary, decentralisation has several advantages. Within their more flexible frames various endeavours can develop there – this sometimes creates a danger for the community, yet at the same time it is an important source for progress.
 
 

Also the additional units which the inner front-section "co-ordination" imposes on the energons are very diverse in appearance. The most complicated and the most differentiated structures that have ever been produced by energons also belong to them.

In the period of acquisition only some functional units need the movements to be controlled – contrastingly, in the period of construction they all do. This is shown by the construction of every artificial organ and of every organism.

If we build a house, then the laying of every brick, of every pipe, of all wainscoting requires co-ordination just as every cut of the spade does, every transport of material, every installation. It is just the same with the "construction" of organisms, of their "ontogenesis". Only by appropriate co-ordination of the single cell divisions and differentiations can bones, leaves, blood vessels and a central nervous system come into existence.

As we know today there are two different "techniques" in the development of animals. Those with "mosaic-germs" – for instance insects, molluscs – have a tightly centralised process of construction. The structures growing out of the germ cell are very limited already from the beginning onwards and can only build certain defined organs. With animals with "regulation-germs" – for instance animals with spines and amphibians – the cellular sections maintain more independence, more "potential". Similar to plants here, too, single cells – if one separates them out– can form the whole body. Their way of construction is thus more "federalisic".

The fact that with functional units the co-ordination of both the construction and the activity have to be as cheap as possible and has to be as precise and as fast as possible goes without saying. Here the standard of speed again has a stronger influence on competitiveness. Here, too, the situation in phases of acquisition, in phases of rest and in phases of standstill is a fundamentally different one – so they have to be assessed separately. This "sector" also thus supplies us – just like the sector "ties" – with twelve further values that are relevant for the assessment of competitiveness.

Every functional unit has to be tied to its energon, many functional units have to be co-ordinated in the active fulfilment of their functions. Furthermore, another, by far more complex interaction is of utmost significance.
 

 
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Comments:

¹ I will give an overview of the definitions of the term “soul” in Appendix 1.
² I am avoiding the term “connection” on purpose. In a very inaccurate linguistic usage it describes two groups of phenomenons which have to be separated according to the theory of the energon. If one says that two bricks are “connected” by mortar – then one means that material bodies are tied up to each other. However, if one says that a telephonic “connection” has been established, then what happens here is the linking of energetic processes: words that hurry to and fro – thus it concerns phenomenons that manifest themselves in the dimension time. They, however, are functionally completely different tasks. Therefore I use the term “bond” for the first problem, and “coordination” (as there is no appropriate German word) for the second problem.
³ To consider the air that is in a business as a “means of production” because it is required for the communication might seem futile and erroneous to an economist. However, that opinion will change, it the first business is set up on the moon. As she does not have an atmosphere it is impossible to communicate via sound signals. An additional effort – for instance for communicating via electromagnetic waves – then becomes necessary in order to replace a means of production that is missing.
⁴ The term “information” as it is used for what is measured with “bit” is rightly controversial as the cybernetic term differs fundamentally from the linguistic usage of the word “information”. The use of that term without an exact knowledge of the mathematically formulated basis by C. Shannon is therefore dangerous and has already led to many misunderstandings. A comprehensible critic can be found in B. Hassenstein’s work “Was ist Information?” in “Naturwissenschaft und Medizin”, Mannheim 1966.
⁵ It would be more exact to call them IRM – “innate recognising mechanisms” because it is not the “triggering” but the “recognition” which is the peculiar and difficult achievement of those functional units. “Recognition” is certainly not supposed to be understood in the sense of conscious processes but rather generally in the sense of a data-processing (data-integrating) achievement. It is that neutral meaning that is also meant with “innate recognition” in ethnology.
⁶ I will come back to the significance of the “impetus-mechanisms” (drives) which also influence that interplay by creating different “moods” in part 4, chapter II.
⁷ According to today’s state of research there exists a short-term memory (“fluorescence memory”) and a long-term memory. Here the latter is discussed.
⁸ When Plenge makes an alteration of the motto Cogito ergo sumus – I think, therefore we are – he states more precisely the position of humans. Plenge adds: “For I could not think if not We, the human society had created the language and the way of thinking.” (“Drei Vorlesungen über die allgemeine Organisationslehre”, Essen 1919, p. 39.)
⁹ I have already gone into that topic in “We Humans”. Vienna 1968, S. 125f.
¹⁰ O. G. d’Estaing, “La décentralisation des pouvoirs dans l’enterprise”.